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INTRODUCTION
The legal aspects of epilepsy encompass all the issues
that are encountered in the legal considerations that
affect any person’s everyday life. These areas include
all those experiences that involve the home, work,
driving, inter-personal relationships and virtually
every aspect of daily living. There is no reason to
suspect that these legal issues should be any different
to those facing people who do not have epilepsy.
The real difference is that the person with epilepsy
has a stigmatizing condition which further impacts
upon these experiences which are magnified when
encountering people who are ignorant of what it means
to have epilepsy or for that matter any other similar
chronic medical illness.
Unlike many chronic illnesses, epilepsy is an
unpredictable condition in which there are a variety
of different seizure types and syndromes1, 2. This
means that each person who has epilepsy is a unique
individual, as determined both by their personal make-
up and by the influence that their epilepsy may exert
upon who and what they are.
What follows is a brief overview of the legal aspects
of epilepsy with special reference to medical issues
that might emerge within the context of the Common
Law environment as exists in countries like the United
Kingdom, United States, South Africa or Australia.
This is not intended to deny the presence of other
legal systems, such as Civil Law jurisdictions as exist
in Europe, but rather it acknowledges the constraints
that are imposed upon the preparation of this type of
limited treatise.
DUTY OF CARE
Because epilepsy is a chronic medical condition, there
are specific legal issues which directly impact upon
the doctor–patient relationship. Of these, the most
important consideration is that of ‘Duty of Care’.
By definition, duty of care represents the legal
responsibilities that the carer owes to the patient and
which must be provided to ensure that the carer is not
the subject of litigation3. As stated earlier, patients
with epilepsy are not greatly different from any other
patient who is treated by a doctor. Within the common
law perspective, namely judge made law essentially
based on precedence within an adversarial adjudicated
process with clearly defined hierarchical avenues for
appeal, there are essentially three principal obligations
owed by the medical practitioner to the patient. These
include ethical obligations, obligations consequent to
the law of contract and obligations which emerge from
the law of torts4, 5.
In a brief treatise, such as this, there is little scope to
fully discuss issues of ethics, as this would constitute a
publication in its own right6. Nevertheless one cannot
ignore the interaction between ethical and legal issues
because this interaction will unequivocally influence
any deliberation that aims to provide a comprehensive
conclusion. In areas, such as research, the ethical
dictates that are encompassed in Good Clinical
(Research) Practice7 take priority over those dogma
that are the purvey of a strictly limited legal debate.
Acceptable research methods demand adherence to
a code of conduct, based on the Declaration of
Helsinki8 and usually formulated by the nation’s
peak health and research council9. These codes of
conduct transcend rigid legal parameters and cannot be
ignored when evaluating the legal issues that prevail.
Failure to respect these rules, should an unwanted
consequence ensue, will more than likely result in a
finding of failure to provide duty of care. Ethics are
not a finite set of rules, but rather, they represent a
fluid philosophically accepted set of guidelines which
correspond to the prevailing morals of the particular
society involved10. This demonstrates the cultural
influence imposed upon ethical considerations within
a given situation. Any single society can incorporate
a number of different cultural groupings, hence the
ethical considerations, within that society, can be far
more varied than is the case within defined legal
parameters which must accommodate the predominant
community thinking.
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The implications of contract law, for medical
practice, are more theoretical than practical. In reality,
the courts have determined that, unless the doctor
has clearly promised a cure, then failure to provide a
cure cannot be assumed to be a breach of contract4.
Within the context of epilepsy, the patient cannot
claim a breach of contract merely because the
prescribed medication, be it one of the anti-epileptic
medications, failed to control the seizures. The courts
have determined that the doctor is obliged to provide a
minimum standard of care for the patient, using what
is termed, ‘reasonable skill and care’4, 11.
It follows that the main scope for the consideration
of duty of care emerges from torts law. Tort law is
the embodiment of the Common Law system that
encompasses any wrong, not arising out of contract,
for which the court may determine a remedy by
way of compensation or damages. As defined above,
it is ‘judge made’ law, founded on prior case law,
determined consequent to an adversarial process based
on plaintiff and defendant lawyers arguing the merits
of a particular circumstance. The decision of the
lower court may be subjected to a hierarchical appeals
process culminating in the ultimate appeals court, be
it the High or Supreme Court, which determines the
rationale that decides the outcome of future similar
cases within its jurisdiction12. The main avenue for the
application of torts law regarding duty of care arises
from the concept of negligence4.
It has been established that the doctor owes a duty
of care to his or her patient and failure to satisfy this
responsibility, thereby causing damage to the patient,
results in the doctor being liable in negligence3. At
least in the Australian jurisdiction the courts have
made it quite clear that it is the courts’ authority
to decide what constitutes negligence. Cases such as
Rogers v Whitaker 13 have cast considerable doubt on
the relevance of peer group practices which used to
provide the bench mark for such deliberations, as was
encapsulated in the British Bolam Principle14. The
courts have gone so far as to review and to criticize the
length of time that a doctor spends in consultation with
patients, namely the capacity to overbook a practice’s
work-load15. This is especially so if it is deemed that
the negligence that ensued might have been a direct
consequence of such booking practices which denied
the patient adequate time to present their case or to be
heard. Doctors have an obligation to ensure that test
results have been scrutinized, correctly reported and if
necessary acted upon16, 17.
Failure to satisfy the absolute dictates of duty of
care is not, of itself, tantamount to negligence. For
litigation to be successful, the plaintiff must establish
that damage was directly consequent to the alleged
deficiency. In other words, there must be both cause
and effect and, further, the cause must be proximal to
the effect, not indirectly related, and the effect must be
the damage experienced by the patient. This situation
is encountered in the British case in which a workman
consumed arsenic and on attendance at hospital the
doctor failed to attend him with the patient leaving
the emergency department without proper medical
attention. The patient subsequently died but the expert
testimony established that, despite the failure to attend,
the condition was irreversible by the time of seeking
assistance18. Thus an action in negligence failed.
Some areas of duty of care that do need elaborating
upon, include advising the patient of all material risks
to ensure informed consent13 and also advising of
any particular clinician’s potential limitations with
respect to others who may be more experienced19.
Despite these considerable demands on the clinician,
the plaintiff must still establish that he or she would
have acted differently as a result of any particular
advice that may or may not have been given20.
Perhaps one of the most compelling legal issues,
specifically regarding epilepsy, to emerge from recent
times has been the Australian case in which it was
established that a competent doctor has an enforceable
responsibility to attend a patient reported to be
experiencing status epilepticus21. Failure to provide
emergency intervention may constitute negligence if
damages arise.
Some of the prominent domains that still need
to be explored include those issues relating to:
informed consent; the legal requirements that occur
in the management of patients; the expectation for
the doctor to properly consider the patient within
the work or employment environment; issues of
confidentiality; issues relating to pharmaceuticals and
the prescription thereof; and the inter-professional
relationships between the doctor and other health
care workers, such as nurses and allied health
professionals3.
INFORMED CONSENT
Informed consent represents one of the most emotive
and evolving current issues within duty of care
because without consent the patient lacks the em-
powerment to agree, or disagree, to any treatment or
procedure that might be offered. It is an established
dogma, within medical care, that the patient has the
right for self-determination. This concept demands
that the patient is in possession of all the necessary
relevant information upon which to base a decision20.
Once it can be established that the patient had even
the broadest understanding of any procedure that was
to be undertaken, even if damages ensued, then the
question automatically shifts from one of battery (an
attack against a person) to one of negligence22. Thus
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negligence is the principal cause for action in the legal
consideration of duty of care4.
The courts have established that despite the duty of
care being a comprehensive responsibility, ‘. . . There
is a fundamental difference between, on the one
hand, diagnosis and treatment, and on the other
hand, the provision of advice or information to the
patient. . . whether the patient has been given all the
relevant information to choose between undergoing
and not undergoing the treatment. . . is not a question
the answer to which depends upon medical standards
or practices. . . Rather the skill is in communicating
the relevant information to the patient in terms
which are reasonably adequate for that purpose
having regard to the patient’s apprehended capacity
to understand that information. . . ’23. It follows that
the court has reserved for itself the right to determine
what constitutes the provision of adequate advice to
be given to the patient so as to achieve the necessary
empowerment and, hence, the legal foundations of
informed consent.
There are some guidelines that have been prepared
by various authorities which include: ‘. . . sufficient
information about the condition, investigation options,
treatment options, benefits, possible adverse effects or
complications and the likely result if the treatment
is not undertaken. . . ’24. Informed consent, which
implies that the patient has the capacity to decide their
own therapy, requires the patient to be advised of all
those issues, which in the opinion of the patient (and
possibly the court should the matter come to litigation)
are material to the patient’s decision making process
and which would have resulted in the patient adopting
a particular behaviour.
Where the patient lacks the capacity to make
the necessary decision to allow treatment there are
usually protective measures to allow others to offer
surrogate determination of what is in the patient’s
best interests25. There are a number of circumstances
in which the patient is incapable of deciding their
own treatment, these include: where the patient
inherently lacks the capacity to decide due to long
standing intellectual deficit, such as developmental
delay or dementia; situations in which emergency
treatment is required with the acute illness depriving
the patient of the cognition to decide, such as status
epilepticus; and circumstance in which the treatment
which has already commenced has interrupted the
patient’s capacity to decide, as may occur in the
patient who is unconscious due to an anaesthetic and
the patient requires further intervention for which
prior consent was not obtained. In these situations
the doctor may approach a deputizing authority, such
as a Guardianship Board, which has the legislated
authority to decide for the patient, in the patient’s best
interests, where the potential benefit is determined to
outweigh the risks. In emergencies the doctor may
make such decision if it is deemed that there is
insufficient time to seek Guardianship approval and
there are no available next of kin to offer consent. Such
authority is only available for the period of time in
which the patient is at risk of damage and does not
persist into the convalescent period once the danger
has subsided26.
EMPLOYMENT
People with epilepsy may be recognized as disabled,
and if so recognized, would come under the protection
of the various anti-discrimination acts which abound
through out the world27. There is little doubt that such
a case could be mounted to argue that the person with
epilepsy needs to be accommodated within the work
environment28. This offers little comfort to the person
who cannot find suitable employment.
While it is possible to legislate for a fair deal it is far
more difficult to enforce such legislation. The person
who has acknowledged that he or she has epilepsy
will have greater difficulty finding employment and
the employer will always be able to claim that the
final reason for excluding the applicant with epilepsy
was based upon other criteria which the successful
candidate better demonstrated.
The doctor who examines the person with epilepsy,
prior to employment does have a responsibility to
properly advise the patient of the suitability of the
considered occupation. Damage, consequent to failure
to so advise, may well constitute negligence although
case law in this domain is sparse29.
CONFIDENTIALITY
Nowhere is the question of confidentiality more tested,
than in the field of epileptology, than in the domain of
consideration of whose role and responsibility it is to
report people with epilepsy to driving authorities30.
Epilepsy and driving is the subject of texts in its own
right31 and will not be further discussed in this brief
overview other than to say that this whole area of legal
debate is finally acknowledging the contribution that
experts can play in achieving an equitable outcome32.
It is extremely difficult for the law to recognize that
each person with epilepsy is a unique individual with
unique criteria which must be considered before that
individual has been afforded a proper and reasonable
hearing to determine his or her own fitness to drive. At
least within the Australian context there has emerged
an understanding that different types of epilepsy
require different restrictions to the issuing of drivers’
licences31, 32. Where the problem arises is in the
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context of the responsibility for reporting that indi-
vidual who refuses to self-report epilepsy to driving
authorities or, even more so, whether it is reasonable
for every patient with epilepsy to be expected to be
on a record merely because they have had seizures,
now or in the past. There has been considerable debate
as to what should happen, especially with regards
to confidentiality, with regards to the patient who is
recalcitrant to the medical advice given33.
When taken out of the context of driving, the
question of confidentiality is far easier to address.
It goes back to the very roots of modern medicine
with the Hippocratic Oath and virtually all subsequent
ethical dogma which proliferate within medical
deliberations, namely that the sanctity of the doctor–
patient relationship is one of absolute respect for all
information that passes between doctor and patient34.
While each jurisdiction will have its own guidelines
for the intrusion into this privileged confidential zone,
as may be required by the court, the general tenor is
for the doctor and health care worker to fully respect
the confidential nature of all information that passes as
a consequence of the therapeutic relationship35, 36.
OTHER HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
When considering the legal aspects of the medical
management of epilepsy it is easy to lose sight of
the fact that doctors are only one component of the
therapeutic team. Other contributors include nurses
or pharmacists both of whom can play a major role
in the everyday care of the patient and have defined
responsibilities37, 38.
The actual definition of their legal responsibility
remains not dissimilar to that of the doctor. Within
the Australian context the nurse has historically been
an extension of the medical practitioner’s health care
delivery37. This implies that the doctor has a specific
liability to ensure that the nurse fully understands that
which is expected of him or her. This in turn implies
that the doctor has the added obligation to ensure
proper lines of communication39.
A body of opinion is emerging that sees the role of
the nurse practitioner or the pharmacist practitioner
expanding to the point that it subsumes many of
the functions of the general practitioner37. While
this move is being generally resisted by the medical
profession, it is receiving political support because it
is assumed to be able to provide cheaper health care
without excessive compromise on quality. Whether
this attitude is correct or not is too early to predict
but what can be said is that as the role of these allied
health care professionals expands so will their legal
liability. What is not as well recognized is that the
pragmatic realism of litigation will still seek to include
‘the defendant with the deepest pockets’ and as such,
even if this dilution of responsibility continues its
current path, the doctor will remain the main target
of the attorney who specializes in medical negligence
litigation.
CONCLUSION
What has been presented in this brief overview is but
an introduction to the relevant issues that emerge when
considering legal aspects of epilepsy and the law. It
has focused predominantly on clinical medicine rather
than aspects of every day life which also have the
capacity to generate legal debate. It is clear that the
person with epilepsy will encounter all the legal issues
that confront the person who does not have epilepsy,
such as family law, criminal law and all facets of the
legal system but these, non-medical domains, have
largely have been ignored in this dissertation. The per-
son with epilepsy has further legal considerations as
a consequence of experiencing a stigmatized chronic
medical illness which is essentially unpredictable until
it is brought under control. Again consideration of
issues resulting from this unpredictability which fall
outside the clinical model have not been addressed in
this discussion but their relevance to the patient cannot
be ignored in the wider debate.
By far the most relevant medico-legal aspect of the
topic revolves around consideration of duty of care.
This duty represents the single most important facet
of medico-legal responsibility between the doctor and
the patient. Even this doctor–patient relationship is
undergoing change with the emergence of greater
therapeutic roles being ascribed to allied health
professionals, such as nurses and pharmacists.
While it was once accepted that the prevailing
standard of duty of care was defined by that which
was practiced by a contemporaneous respected group
of peers, who provided care at the same time as any
alleged infraction (Bolam Principle), this no longer
carries weight in law. The interpretation of what
constitutes the parameters of duty of care, at least
within the current Common Law jurisdictions, remains
an evolving field of legal authority in which the legal
profession, in particular the courts, has reserved, for
itself, the final arbitration of its acceptable frame of
reference.
It might be argued that the standards required for
undertaking diagnosis and prescribing treatment may
well place substantive authority on the evidence of
practices followed by a group of peers, even this is
not cast in stone. The court has the right to decide the
appropriateness of the conduct of the clinician, even to
the assessment of the time taken to assess each patient,
within all facets of clinical practice and any behaviour
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which has resulted in causing harm to the patient may
be deemed to represent negligence deserving of rem-
edy. This assumes greater proportions when evaluating
the adequacy of information provided to the patient
and the need to warn of any material risks. In this
domain the courts have determined that the practices
of colleagues are largely irrelevant to deciding the final
verdict of what constitutes informed consent.
The clinical role of the doctor is not limited to
just diagnosis and management and comprises a
comprehensive duty of care. This includes all advice
given within the context of the clinical relationship.
Such advice can encompass guidance with regards to
employment and suitability of the work environment
or the acceptability to be allowed to drive a motor
vehicle. Failure to give the correct advice may result
in successful litigation for negligence. Conversely,
injudicious revelation of the patient’s clinical status,
even with the best of intentions of either protecting
the patient or relevant others, may breach guidelines
for confidentiality and also provide the basis for
successful suit.
The purpose of this examination of the legal
issues of epilepsy was not intended to generate angst
amongst conscientious clinicians but, as someone who
considers himself such a doctor, I am yet to perform
such an overview without feeling deep seated disquiet
about a perceived inability to protect oneself from
litigation. At least within the Australian context, I have
repeatedly heard it said that one has not had sufficient
clinical exposure if one has not been the subject of at
least one court action.
This review offers the clinician the unequivocal right
to experience true paranoia without the diagnosis of
psychosis. It further supports the ever-growing trend
to practice defensive medicine although such practices
will not provide conclusive defence against a claim of
negligence, the final outcome of which is not decided
by peers with similar medical knowledge but by a
quite different professional body.
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